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“Constitutionalism In Africa: Creating Opportunities, Facing Challenges” (2001),
Oloka-Onyango, J., ed., Notes, refs, index, xi, 345pp, UGANDA. FOUNTAIN
PUBLISHERS
This extraordinary edited book of words, style, illustrations and arguments provides a
relevant insight into African constitutionalism from the past until the present, with
projections into the future. The success of this book is, in fact, in the scholarly and
editorial ingenuity of both the contributors and the editor. Oloka-Onyango combines
creative authors who use law, gender, literature, pan-Africanism, language, politics,
religion and ethnicity as disciplinary arenas of examination. The book is about rewriting African constitutions and constitutionalism in ways that reflect African people
power. Whether by reverting to oral constitutionalism of African traditional societies as
Antonia Kalu suggests, or introducing positive discrimination quota systems for
affirmative action as Sylvia Tamale suggests, all the authors seem to agree that the
phenomenon of executive prerogatives and excess cannot continue unchecked by law
and principle.
Constitutionalism defined. Kalu sees constitutionalism as the carefully crafted
relationship between recognizable national ideas and the day-to-day practice of
citizenship. She cautions against neo-colonial constitutionalism in Africa by continual
use of “Western classrooms” models introduced in the colonial era. Likewise, several
chapters acknowledge that many African governments and the drafters of various
constitutions have manipulated the instruments in order to deny people their rights and
freedoms. Analyses in all the chapters of the book reveal beyond doubt that the human
rights schemes in various constitutions examined discriminate against both men and
women and put undesirable restrictions on rights granted to people in international
human rights documents. Particularly beyond that, there is a fair agreement that in the
formulation of African constitutions, women face the plight of the larger half; they face
limitations on their sexual orientation (Mazrui, Chapter 1), ethnicity (GahamanyiMbaye, Chapter 5), indigenous citizenship (Tajudeen, Chapter 4), religious freedoms
(Ola Aboa Zeid, Chapter 10), and they are socially and economically under-privileged
(Tamale, Chapter 12).
Another observation is that neutrality in human rights is not guaranteed in African
constitution formulation. In some cases, reservations have been made to various articles
and principles of international law and human rights principles in the belief that the
articles violate inter alia, traditional cultural rights, the teachings of Shari’a, human
dignity, and established supposedly “moral,” sexual behavior and African custom. For
example, Article 1(a) of the Cairo Declaration recognizes that all human beings are
equal, albeit in human dignity not ‘rights’ (Zeid). The question, which then arises, is
what is African and what is Western, and how can we be “African” without appearing
to deny rights that are inherent? Is it possible to develop an African constitutionalism
when Africa, especially sub-Saharan Africa, is interpretively working with ‘Westernized’
law models that conflict with the Arab and African interpretation and practice of Shari'a
law? Is it fair to argue that international law is indeed originally European law and to a
large extent continues to be since no Islamic, African states were involved in its
formulation? For example the introduction of ‘Temporary Protection’ in International
Refugee Law is a justification of Western international law, not applicable to existing

refugee situations on the African continent. If African feminists argue that international
law was not originally neutral to women’s concern, do they recognize this also in other
parts of international law?
Most of the contributors to the anthology acknowledge that in the advancements of the
women’s movement, constitutional provisions in many parts of Africa are still
essentially masculinist. Tamale (Chapter 12) expounds on the affirmative action strategy
introduced in Uganda to boost women’s political, social and educational achievements.
Due to masculinist meritocracy, social privilege, and notions of African
communitarianism, affirmative action has not translated well into women
empowerment. She argues for positive discrimination such as affording education for all
girls at primary and secondary education as a model affirmative action. Additionally,
many women run the high risk of losing citizenship in Africa, since most marriages are
patriarchal (Tajudeen, Chapter 4), patrilocal (Pereira, Chapter 9), or patriligious (Zeid,
Chapter 10). Pereira recounts a situation where in Nigeria married women who move to
their marital states lose indigenous citizenship in both their father’s indigenous states
and their marital states.
In Chapter 1, Mazrui tables the issue of sexual orientation, which is indeed controversial
to Muslim Africa and parts of Sub-Saharan Africa. He argues that African constitutions
have not been well formulated to serve the interests of the people instead; political
leaders and cultural institutions have engineered notions of “acceptable sexual
behavior”. Ali Mazrui points out that in many African states, such as President Moi’s
Kenya, President Museveni’s Uganda and President Mugabe’s Zimbabwe, individual
offences against economic and political order are more tolerated than individual sexual
offences. Homosexuals for example, are denied a place in some African constitutions.
Conclusively, people-centered constitutions should limit state power in the African
individual private life.
Another issue explored is the negotiation of religious differences in constitutional
making tomorrow to guarantee protection of African people and their religious
preferences. In Chapter 10, Oba Zeid challenges the state-inspired interpretation of
human rights principles using grassroots public opinion and action. Using the example
of Muslim Africa, activities of liberal Muslims and public opinion should be encouraged
to negotiate existing schemes to protect people of other religious beliefs and women
from state inspired interpretations of international law.
A couple of arguments made by the contributors are discomforting. For example, Kalu
in Chapter 3 makes the argument that ancestral constitutionalism is only unique to
Africa and not in the United States and Eastern Europe. In contrast, Native Americans
had ancestral constitutions before colonialism that the tribes have maintained through
meticulous oral history guaranteeing them rights of self-government, freedom of choice
and expression within their own territories. Peter Mukidi Walubiri’s argument that
constitutionalism is a process of state empowering the people, contradicts the reality that
people empower the state and this should be the precedent. Ola Zeid, (Chapter 10)
seems to infer that restrictions in Shari’a laws are unique in comparison to other laws in
Africa. Yet, in “Christian Africa”, such restrictions occur in laws inter alia, relating to
terrorism, the media, political association, gender and asylum. Zeid also dwells on

married Muslim women but fails to demonstrate what Shari’a law provides for single
Muslim women and female youths.
This book is written entirely by Africans working on the continent and Africa Diaspora.
Though the authors are primarily scholars, this is not your typical scholarly piece. It is
therefore good forage for activists, researchers, civil society, judiciary, legislators and all
pan-africanists. Unlike other scholarly writings on Africa published and accessible only
in “Western” libraries, this book is published and available in Kampala, Uganda. It
captures so eloquently the ongoing constitutional debate in Africa. If you know the
authors, this book makes you feel like you are in fact having a one-to-one conversation
and if you do not, you will be glad you found them.
Doreen Lwanga
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